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ABSTRACT           
 
An international cricket match-fixing scandal in 2000, the biggest crisis in the game’s 250 year history, 
disclosed corruption by many players and officials that cricket authorities had failed to address for a 
decade. Analysis of the case has revealed that institutional-wide behavior, conceptualized as the 
phenomenon of a ‘nexus of silence’, occurs in organizations and institutions where authorities decide to 
hide, rather than control, unethical behavior. This paper presents a substantive theory of a ‘nexus of 
silence’, developing current literature on organizational silence and organizational hypocrisy. Discussion 
on the applicability of a ‘nexus of silence’ to management theory and directions for future research 
completes the paper.  
 
Keywords: corruption, organizational silence, organizational hypocrisy, ethics, corporate governance, 
trust. 
 
INTRODUCTION          
 
On 7 April 2000, the cricket world was shocked by the news that Delhi Police had uncovered 
evidence that South African cricket captain Hansie Cronje and other players were associated with 
bookmakers in manipulating the results of international cricket matches. This watershed event created a 
media scandal with government inquiries in South Africa and India, public release of previous inquiry 
reports on match-fixing, and the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Unit by the International Cricket 
Council (ICC) which produced its own report on corruption in the game. The inquiry reports disclosed 
that, since the early 1990s, cricket was riddled with match-fixing corruption about which authorities had 
failed to act effectively. Indulging in ‘organizational hypocrisy’, where their decisions and actions were at 
variance with the espoused values of cricket, national and international authorities had allowed a ‘nexus 
of silence’ about match-fixing to envelop the institution preventing effective action to remove the 
corruption. 
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Corporate scandals, involving long standing unethical or more serious misbehaviour in 
organizations unconstrained and covered up by management and corporate trustees, are not unusual, but 
there have been few attempts to conduct empirical research on such cases. The aim of this research into 
the match-fixing scandal in cricket has been to answer the question – ‘how could authorities allow this 
scandal to happen?’ -  resulting in the development of a substantive theory of a ‘nexus of silence’, linking 
organizational silence to organizational hypocrisy.  
This paper presents a brief explanation of the methodology used, a model depicting the 
phenomenon of a ‘nexus of silence’, a summarized literature review on organizational silence and 
organizational hypocrisy, the case study summary, an brief explanation of the ‘nexus of silence’ 
phenomenon, and short summary of the findings, theoretical contributions, implications of the research 
for management theory, limitations of the study and future research directions. 
METHODOLOGY, MODEL EXPLANATION, LITERATURE REVIEW 
    
Grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), suitable for research in management 
(Goulding, 2002; Locke, 2001; Remenyi et al, 1998), was used in analyzing documents related to the 
scandal. Disparate documents were assembled into a case study, with coded data categorized as context, 
causes, conditions and consequences of the central phenomenon which emerged allowing the story of 
match-fixing to be told around the silence of many stakeholders when dealing with the problem of 
corruption. Figure 1 depicts a substantive theory which emerged linking ‘organizational hypocrisy’ and a 
‘nexus of silence’.       
Figure 1 
Model of ‘Organizational Hypocrisy and a ‘Nexus of silence’ over corruption: 
Context, Core Value Focus, Problem-Solving and Public Awareness   
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A ‘nexus of silence’, institutional wide silence by stakeholders who become aware of the 
problem, occurs in a particular contexts where management and corporate ‘trustees’, faced with the issue 
of corruption or other unethical behaviour, fail to focus on the institution’s espoused values, choosing a 
path of organizational hypocrisy rather than organizational integrity. They enact and maintain a ‘nexus of 
silence’ in order to ‘sweep under the carpet’ or ‘cover up’ the problem, which only dissipates when 
‘scandal’ breaks and the ‘cover up’ fails, after which they move to ‘clean the Augean stables’ (Sinclair, 
2000: 7). The ‘nexus of silence’ concept describes pervasive silence, not just of employees, but of people 
at all organization levels and of stakeholders. It has previously been found by this researcher in the ‘Holy 
Watergate’ scandal involving cover up of sex abuse by clergy in the Archdiocese of Boston (Gross, 
2005).  
Silence has a substantial literature, but a literature review by Morrison and Milliken’s indicated 
that “research on silence within organizations is more recent and sparse” (2003: 1354). Organizational 
silence (Morrison & Milliken 2000, 2004), to which the concept of a ‘nexus of silence’ can be related, is 
the widespread withholding of information by employees, which occurs in “many organizations… caught 
in an apparent paradox in which most employees know the truth about certain issues and problems within 
the organization yet dare not speak the truth to their superiors” (2000: 706). Research on organizational 
silence has mainly focused on ‘employee silence’ (for example, Hirschman, 1970; Argyris, 1977) which 
results from negative forces based on shared assumptions (Schein, 1992: 24-25) producing a ‘climate of 
silence’ on issues where employees believe their views will not be welcome by management, be futile or 
even dangerous (Morrison & Milliken, 2004). Employee silence research has addressed issues about 
which employees are silent (Morrison & Milliken, 2000, 2004; Hart & Hazelgrove, 2001; Milliken, 
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Morrison & Hewlin, 2003; Beamish, 2000); motives including fear about punishment (Ryan & Oestreich, 
1991; Milliken and Morrison, 2003), job security (Piderit, 2000), being treated as a whistleblower (Miceli 
and Near, 1992), being labeled negatively (Bowen and Blackmon, 2003; Creed, 2003; Milliken et al, 
2003), not wanting to hurt someone else (Van Dyne, Ang and Botero, 2003), and the belief in the futility 
of speaking up (Van Dyne, Ang and Botero, 2003; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991; Morrison & Milliken, 2000). 
Silence of groups and teams has been found to arise from self–censorship by team members, and from a 
culture of silence (Beamish, 2000; Hart and Hazelgrove, 2001), apathy (Condon, 2001) and ‘social 
loafing’ (Gabrenya et al, 1981).  
Organizational silence has also been noted by researchers in relation to man-made disasters 
(Beamish, 2000; Hopkins, 1999; Turner, 1978), and in long term professional malpractice (Hart and 
Hazelgrove, 2001). In a similar vein, ‘moral muteness’ (Bird and Waters, 1989), ‘moral disengagement’ 
(Beu and Buckley, 2004), and ‘ethical blind spots’ (Moberg, 2006) see managers refrain from talking 
about ethical issues, asking ethical questions about organizational decisions, and ‘turning a blind eye’ to 
unethical behaviour. Organization managers may adopt organizational defense routines when faced with 
situations which are potentially embarrassing or a threat, and where the issue of concern and the defense 
become ‘undiscussable’ (Argyris, 1990, 1994; Schein, 1992). Implications of silence (Morrison & 
Milliken, 2004) include a range of consequences including undermining the reporting of unethical and 
illegal practices and the effectiveness of organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1990; 
Beer and Eisenstadt, 2000; Edmonson, 2003; Morrison and Milliken, 2000). 
‘Organizational hypocrisy’ has been defined as voluntary behavior of an individual acting as an 
organizational trustee whose action does not meet proclaimed values which become excepted 
expectations (Phillippe and Koehler, 2005), as ‘theory-in-practice’ (Argyris and Schon, 1974) or basic 
assumption inconsistency (Schein, 1992), inconsistency in talk, decisions and actions (Brunsson, 1989), 
espoused values and principles at odds with decisions or action (Kouzes and Pozner, 1993) and 
organizations espousing single norm systems living in reality with multi-norm systems (Huzzard and 
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Ostergren, 2002). Revealed hypocrisy of individuals or organizations may lead to loss of reputation and 
trust, restoration of which will be difficult (Dowling, 2001). 
THE CRICKET MATCH-FIXING CASE - A THIN DESCRIPTION 
     
Cricket is an open air game, played between two teams of eleven players with bat and ball, where 
both teams try to win by scoring more runs (between wickets) than the opposition. While betting has had 
a 250 year association with the game (Rait-Kerr, 1950; Birley, 1999), match-fixing relates to ‘deciding 
the outcome of a match before it is played, primarily for monetary gain’ through betting (Qayyum, 1999). 
Besides losing a game deliberately, match-fixing involved betting on individual or collective 
underperformance by some players, insider information provision and player introductions to ‘bookies’, 
and ground preparation to guarantee certain predetermined results (CBI, 2000). Between 1980 and 2000, 
over 50 matches were the subject of match-fixing allegations (Polack and Pettet, 2000; Condon, 2001) 
focused on six high profile cases involving leading players from five national teams.  
Presented in rough chronological order here, case 1 concerned the exploits of former Pakistan 
Cricket Captain Salim Malik who, subject of allegations by fellow team member whistleblowers in 1995 
and 1997 initially treated by Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) investigators as an internal team conflict, was 
exonerated to continue his corrupt activities. In Case 2, leading Australian players Mark Waugh and 
Shane Warne in 1994 accepted money from a ‘bookie’ they knew as “John” in exchange for what seemed 
innocuous information. Discovered early in 1995, they were fined by the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) 
after a private, informal inquiry, but not banned from cricket, a fact known to the two ICC officials. 
Disclosed late in 1998 after a media leak, the ACB were accused of hypocrisy (Head, 1998) after which a 
second inquiry admonished the ACB for their judgment (O’Regan, 1999). Case 3 saw Australian players 
Waugh and Warne, together with team member Tim May, after a media leak in 1995 allege that 
Pakistan’s Salim Malik offered them money to throw matches on two occasions in 1994, which they 
declined. A PCB Inquiry (Ebrahim, 1995) into these allegations were not subjected to a process of cross-
examination after the ACB refused to let them travel to Pakistan, resulting in exoneration for Malik as in 
case 1. Addressed again in 1998-9 by a Pakistan Government Inquiry (Qayyum, 1999) during which time 
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the ACB handling of case 2 became public, evidence against Malik and other Pakistan players resulted in 
them being found guilty, but only in 2000 when the report was released after nine months in the hands of 
the Pakistan government. 
Effectively ‘swept under the carpet’ in mid-1995, match-fixing allegations resurfaced on 11 June 
1997 in case 4 with news stories and allegations in the Indian magazine Outlook India about match-fixing 
by Indian players (Bahal & Prasad, 1997). Examined and dismissed by an Indian Cricket Board (BCCI) 
Inquiry (Chandrachud, 1997), this inquiry report too was not released until 2000 shortly before an Indian 
government Police investigation in 2000 disclosed evidence of corrupt dealings between Indian 
bookmakers and international cricketers (CBI, 2000). Indian captain Mohammad Azharuddin was banned 
for life and other players fined and banned for varying periods by the BCCI (Madhaven, 2002). Case 5 
comprised allegations by England player Chris Lewis that approaches were made to him by ‘Indian 
nationals’ in London. Passed to Metropolitan Police by the ECB in 1999, the case became somewhat of 
an embarrassment when made public with no action taken to prosecute the villains. Up until the scandal in 
April 2000, cricket and government authorities did their best to ‘cover up’ the corruption.  However, case 
6 comprising the allegations against and confession of South African captain Hansie Cronje proved to be 
a watershed event that prodded hitherto reluctant and apathetic authorities into more resolute action. 
Cronje was banned for life and other South African players given lesser bans and fines, but the ‘scandal’ 
dragged on for 15 months during which time, and since, authorities struggled to ‘clean their Augean 
stables’.   
CONTEXT OF CRICKET MATCH-FIXING       
 
The context in which match-fixing occurred is provided because, as noted by researchers, 
“…particular phenomena occur in dynamic, complex social milieu” (Snook, 2000: 26), and contexts are 
shaped by their increasingly complex external and internal environments (Capon, 2004). What is 
important is that contextual factors, both historical (1744-1980) and contemporary (1980-2000), provided 
antecedent conditions, or ‘exacerbating influences’ (Moberg, 2006), for a ‘nexus of silence’ about match-
fixing.  
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Cricket developed as an imperial English sport in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India 
(now India and Pakistan after the 1947 partition), West Indies, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) and more 
recently Kenya, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe (Williams, 1999: 12-13). Embraced by English clerics and 
schools as Christianity in practice (1999: 5-7; 142-145), cricket was seen as “…more than a game; it was 
invested with special moral worth with cricketers” (1999: vv). Influenced by Lord Harris both in Britain 
and abroad in cricket’s golden ages (Morrah, 1967; Howat, 1989) on the techniques, rules and spirit in 
which cricket was to be played, by 1905 the word ‘cricket’ was synonymous with everything regarded as 
fair, straight forward and right (Coldham, 1983: 105).  
But this espoused ‘spirit of cricket’ was not practiced over the next sixty years. Firstly, it was 
breached by the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) in the infamous ‘bodyline’ test series in Australia in 
1932-33 (Douglas, 2002; Fingleton, 1946; Frith 2002a, 2002b; Jardine 1933) with ‘fast leg theory’, 
involving bowling at the body of the batsman, “…perfectly within the Laws of Cricket, but seen at an 
early stage by many and later by most to be contrary to the spirit of cricket” (Benaud, 2005: 38). 
Secondly, it was breached by practices such as throwing, ball tampering, sledging and arguing with the 
umpire on-field, and lower standards of social behaviour off-field (Smith 2000: vii). Authorities failed to 
act on these deviant practices until 2000 when it was seen as necessary to expand the Laws on unfair play 
and to write a Preamble to those Laws entitled “The Spirit of Cricket” to publicly educate players and 
officials (Oslear, 2000; Smith 2000).  
Another contextual factor was the commercialization of cricket with its transformation from a 
sport to a media–entertainment, changing its values and the focus of cricket administrators. 
Commercialization began with World Series Cricket (WSC), established by Australian media owner 
Kerry Packer in 1976 in response to the refusal of the ACB to grant him media coverage of cricket, 
creating a schism in the game with the best players moving to WSC as highly paid professionals. WSC 
popularized the shorter version game, the one-day international (ODI), before a compromise in 1979 
ended the schism providing Packer with TV rights for Australian cricket, and the ACB again with sole 
administration of cricket in Australia (Blofeld, 1978; Haigh, 2000; McFarline, 1977; Piesse, 2000; 
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Wright, 1993). Significantly, WSC cricket was criticized at the time that it was played for money, not 
love of country; and early exciting games were written off as rigged, like professional wrestling (Stone, 
2000: 146). Increasingly, as in other sports, media would reshape the game to serve the public, whose 
interests were represented by media and sponsors. 
During the match-fixing period, commercialization was accompanied by growth of the popular 
ODIs with consequent media coverage and sponsorship, neutral venue development, illegal betting on 
cricket in India, and technology development (the spread of TV and mobile phones in India) shaped the 
cricket environment. Commercialism transformed cricket “from a participatory to a popular culture” 
(Pathak, 2004), with media and sponsorship income the driving force in the game, and a source of a 
power shift in cricket from west to east during the 1990s (Bose, 2002; Guha, 2002). This popularity saw 
ODIs increasing in number from 34 in 1971-75 to 635 in 1996-2000 (Wilde, 2003: 20-22). But players 
thought there were too many games “with nothing at stake in terms of national pride or selection” 
(Condon 2001, para 79) where, according to Australian player Mark Waugh, they were ‘like so much 
confetti” (Knight, 2002). Various countries such as United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Canada 
developed new venues where the operators created ODI tournaments with a carnival atmosphere, and 
which Condon found to be locations where players were “treating these events with indifference and the 
opportunity to maximize the receipt of gifts or indulge in under-performance for betting purposes” (2001: 
para 92). In India and Pakistan, illegal betting on cricket increased with the renewal of the matches 
between India and Pakistan in 1978 (2001: para 68) to which regulatory authorities ‘turned a blind eye’ 
and lack of regulatory control allowed corruption unhindered by police (CBI, 2000). Finally, technology 
proliferation with “live television coverage of matches and growth …of ODIs created an environment 
where it was possible to watch and bet on cricket almost every day of the year”, and mobile phone 
technology enabled communication during matches between bookmakers and punters, and in match-
fixing, between ‘bookies’ and corrupt players and journalists (Condon, 2001: para 69).   
Internal conditions conducive to match-fixing were ‘benevolent’ cricket authorities, weak 
governance control systems, lack of accountability of authorities, political conflict inside the ICC, a 
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culture of elitism, tolerance of deviance, and policy, practices and norms that required organizational 
silence, player dissatisfaction over pay and conditions and their lack of say in the game, and limited 
knowledge of the nature of the corruption. Cricket’s traditional authority by the MCC “…has been more 
paternal and benevolent than punitive and rigorous,…rested on tradition and custom,…using discretion 
and tact…with a code of honour put before a set of rules, regulations and provisions” (Williams, 1999: 
20, 24). The MCC was regarded as “a private club with a public function….it reigns but it does not rule” 
(Brayshaw 1985: 13). Changes to cricket Laws featured long deliberation where anything that mattered in 
cricket was, in the Lord’s Committee Room, “…at an early stage, discussed, weighed up, argued over, 
referred back, resurrected for more discussion, and finally pronounced upon with resonance” (Moorhouse, 
1983: 41). Notionally, the governing body of cricket in an operational sense from 1909 was the ICC 
(Halbish, 2003:13), but had little power to act because its members liked it that way (Haigh, 2004: 191). 
Despite its relatively high status, the low governance capacity of the ICC was recognized by Condon as a 
problem , where for “almost half its history, the ICC was a loose and fragile alliance with a small central 
administration based at Lord's in London with limited budgets and powers" (Condon: para 102). With no 
full-time secretariat until 1993, the ICC was required to act according to the collective wishes of its 
national members on all matters including the issue of corruption. The ICC was aptly described by cricket 
writer Gideon Haigh as the dog in the night-time that didn't bark (2004:185-198). National cricket boards 
lacked control systems to manage corruption, and a uniform or cooperative approach to addressing 
problems in the game, prevented by political conflict which dominated the ICC from 1993-1998 with a 
struggle between traditional (west) alliances and newer (east) alliances (Bose, 2002; Guha, 2002; Halbish, 
2003; Majumdar, 2004) over issues of hosting of major events and leadership of the ICC between 1990 
and 1998 (Halbish, 2003: 8-26; Majumdar, 2004:411-422). Nor were most cricket authorities accountable 
to higher authority, the exception being Pakistan, so not brought to account. Players were generally 
dissatisfied with their boards over their views being ignored in the running of the game, conditions for 
players on some tours and their share of increasing cricket revenue. Typical of the authorities was the 
ACB, which made all the players’ decisions, refused to accede to player requests over pay and conditions, 
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used an ‘upstairs-downstairs’ attitude with players, while advising them not to publicly air their 
grievances (Coward, 2002: 15-17). Their dissatisfaction was regarded as among the reasons match-fixing 
developed (Condon, 2001: para 74).  
The culture of cricket (Schein, 1992) changed noticeably with its artifacts (clothing, equipment, 
technology use, game duration and playing times) and in the practice of its traditional espoused values 
which required the game to be played in accordance with the ‘spirit of cricket’. What did not change was 
a shared basic assumption, a ‘belief-in-practice’ of individual and collective stakeholders, that speaking 
up about issues ‘likely to bring the game into disrepute’ was dangerous (Argyris, 1990; Schein, 1992). 
Williams states that in cricket, on  
“incidents that could not be approved of, there has, by common consent, been a policy of hush. 
Cricketers have never believed in washing dirty flannels in public places. Away at Lord’s, hidden 
in recesses called ‘Private’, there is a wash-house with a squeezing machine. The dirt flows down 
the drains…Even reproof has been gently administered at Lord’s” (1999: 24).  
As in other sports, leading players are regarded as elites on the basis of competence. Moberg 
(2006) argues that control of their moral behaviour then becomes problematic. In cricket, over-the-top 
misbehaviour in public was traditionally addressed by having ‘a quiet word’, while on technical and other 
behavioual issues on field technical matters under the Laws were dealt with by the umpires, but with 
many related to excessive competitiveness, authorities exhibited a tolerance for deviance, evidenced by 
their slowness to act on sledging, ball tampering, chucking and the like. The mandatory requirement 
enforced was a Law 42 and related contract provision for organizational silence by players that they not 
‘bring the game into disrepute’. This underlying concern to avoid scandal in cricket is evidenced by 
former ACB CEO Graham Halbish who stated in a 4 Corners interview Fixing Cricket in 2000 that 
“[c]ricket is very traditional … in much preferring not to air its linen in public. It’s always preferred to 
deal with matters behind closed doors, you know, rightly or wrongly. But that is effectively the way the 
game has been administered over a long period of time”. 
NEXUS OF SILENCE - A RICH /THICK DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORY  
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In this context, the first signs of match-fixing appeared in 1975 and 1980 with two stories of 
predetermined toss incidents. Between 1987 and 2000, over 50 international matches would be named in 
various investigations (Condon, 2001; Polack & Pettit, 2000). Cricket’s institutional stakeholders 
exhibited a ‘nexus of silence’ between 1992 and 2001 over match-fixing corruption which, I argue, were 
caused by sense-making, ambivalence, loyalty, and enactment of the culture in cricket.  
Sense-making (Weick, 1998) explains how individuals made sense of match-fixing behaviour 
they experienced retrospectively, through an ongoing process of interaction with others and the cues 
received, and intuitively formed opinions or made decisions on the basis of the incomplete information. In 
1987, when allegations of payments by bookmakers to the Pakistan team first surfaced, team management 
adopted ad-hoc methods to discourage thrown matches. Australian team management, until 1998, became 
aware of, but remained silent about, approaches to team members in 1992. Increasingly, some team 
captains and ‘bookies’ fixed aspects of play in some ODIs or tests at neutral venues. Individual players 
and officials not involved, without knowledge or education on how the corrupt ‘bookies’ established their 
connections and activities behind an image of benevolence and playfulness, despite signs that “something 
is not right”, and amid “buzz” in the form of stories, ‘circuit’ talk and rumors, struggled to make meaning 
of the disjointed information. The scale of match-fixing was small compared with betting on cricket by 
the public, so unnoticed by many. New team members, unable to assert themselves or recognize 
manipulation by their captains, misunderstood more overt discussions and offers; for example, some 
South African players thought Cronje’s discussions with them in 1996 were a morality test, while others 
more knowing but able to resist the offer simply kept silent (King, 2000). Team outsiders were in the dark 
about the nature and extent of match-fixing. Condon reported, in regard to some board members, on the 
“ignorance of worldly wise and mature individuals whom I genuinely believe had no idea what was going 
on” (Condon, 2001: para 14), but perhaps this was board members maintaining ‘ethical distance’ 
(Mellema, 2003). Collective sense-making at team and board levels was also affected, probably by 
organizational silence requirements reinforcing a ‘climate of silence’(Morrison and Milliken 2004: 3). 
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Condon found such a ‘climate of silence’ in 2000 when investigating the corruption for the ICC (2001: 
paras 11-16). Aimed at avoiding scandal, the first cases were dealt with in an informal, ad-hoc way, 
without policies, orally but sometimes in writing, addressing symptoms rather than causes, using vague 
language in sparse communications. In 1995, a two-person ACB management team handled case 2 by 
private discussion, informing the Board at the end of its meeting to avoid dissent or discussion, and hiding 
the issue until 1998. Shortly afterwards, the Ebrahim Inquiry, a quasi-legal internal PCB effort, sought 
evidence from their team members (Case 1) and the Australians (Case 3) about the allegations against 
Malik, but lack of protection for witnesses, lack of evidence, and the non-cooperation and sharing of 
knowledge of the Australians, coupled with the written counsel of the ICC on 13 February 1995 to the 
PCB to “ always [bear] in mind the damage to the image of cricket if allegations were made public in any 
way”, resulted in dismissal of the cases until 1999.  
Ambivalence explains the attitude and behaviour of some players and officials who may have 
experienced conflicting thoughts and feelings about reporting or acting on the information they had 
(Baumann, 1991; Merton, 1976; Piderit, 2000; Smelser, 1998), resorting to silence. Psychological 
ambivalence saw players caught between supporting/being silent about fellow players and admonishing / 
reporting them. Australian team captain Mark Taylor’s comment - “To be totally honest, I hoped for the 
sake of Mark and Shane that the bookmaker story would never become public” (Taylor, 1999: 150), and 
his own silence until 2000, indicates his ambivalence. Sociological ambivalence saw Australian managers 
caught in two minds about how to deal with their elite players with whom there were both personal and 
professional relationships. Ambivalence as a ‘definition problem’ saw many in cricket, such as former 
England captain Nasser Hussain, hold the view that information selling was not match-fixing – “…the 
‘crime’ Shane Warne and Mark Waugh admitted…is not match-fixing at all in my book” (Hussain, 2004, 
274).  
Loyalty norms prevented many players from ‘speaking up’, as Condon identified (2001: para 12) 
was the result of “(p)layers [not wanting] to be branded an informant and risk being ostracized by team 
mates…”,  an example being Michael Slater, who only revealed his information on room-mate Mark 
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Waugh’s dealings with ‘John’ (Case 2) in 2004 (Slater, 2004: 113-114). Loyalty norms of teams are a 
defense against ‘outsiders’, known in cricket to include cricket administration. Team conflict in the 
Pakistan team in 1994 was preceded by stories of players and managers endeavouring to dissuade match-
fixing inside the team since 1989 (Imran Khan in 4 Corners interview Fixing Cricket, 2000). At board 
level, Majid Khan, former player and CEO of the PCB, advised South African CEO Ali Bacher privately 
of his knowledge of match-fixing in 1999, but Bacher only admitted to having that knowledge, and his 
source, when the scandal broke in 2000. Even then, he was criticized by then ICC President Dalmiya for 
raising the issue publicly. For others who had knowledge, stakeholder loyalty to the institution, resulting 
from their ‘capture’ by the institution, resulted in silence about known or suspected corruption by 
journalists or other institutional supporters (Magazine, 1998, 2000), who become ‘moral bystanders’ 
(Bansal and Kandola, 2004), protecting it from scandal. An exception was Cronje’s father who, believing 
his son was a scapegoat for many other players, accused the South African Board (UCBSA) of knowing 
of the corruption problem years before but doing nothing to warn the players (Roebuck, 2002: 19).   
Finally, board apathy was named by Condon as a cause of the match-fixing scandal (2001: para 
10). O’Regan and Qayyum inquiries were critical of the ACB, the ineffectiveness of the BCCI in 
addressing corruption in India commented on publicly by the CBI. ICC President Malcolm Grey, 
admitted to 4 Corners in 2000 that “We should have acted sooner…with greater alacrity…better…we 
didn’t”. Even the Pakistan Government sat on its Qayyum Inquiry report for over six months, releasing it 
only when the scandal broke.  
Intervening conditions (Glaser, 1992: 66) affecting the extent of the silence were the whistle-
blowing from Pakistan and India, investigative media (for example, Bahal and Prasad, 1997; Magazine, 
1998), sports correspondents who were not ‘captive’ of the institution (for example, Ahmed, 1995; Bose, 
1995; Dean, 1995; Roebuck, 1995), and commissioned judges and lawyers who published inquiries held 
from 1997 (Chandrachud, 1997; O’Regan, 1999; Qayyum, 1999; Yousuf, 1998). However, with the 
exception O’Regan’s report, other reports were not released until 2000. While ‘east-west’ politics in the 
ICC prevented collaboration between Australian and Pakistan boards until late 1998, other information 
 13
leaks which became news from 1992-2000 were mostly ignored, minimized or dismissed by cricket 
authorities as allegations without the foundation of evidence.  
Moderator conditions which increased or decreased the level of silence inside the institution were 
the organizational defensive routines enacted by cricket authorities in order to avoid embarrassment or 
threat and prevent actors from discussing the defense (Argyris, 1993: 15), and legalistic approaches 
(Sitkin and Bies, 1994) in the form of internal inquiries to formally address the problem of publicly 
known unresolved allegations. National cricket authorities, and the ICC executive, initially reacted by 
ignoring signs of corruption (PCB from 1990-4; ACB from 1992-4), addressing corruption allegations as 
internal conflict issues (PCB in 1994), holding ad-hoc, non-transparent inquiries (ACB in 1994, PCB in 
1995), lack of systems to receive and deal with complaints and allegations, enacting a policy of silence 
(ACB and ICC executive in 1995), punishment of whistle-blowers (PCB in 1995) and fragmenting the 
cases (ICC, ACB and PCB in 1995), with the effect that the corruption issue was ‘swept under the carpet’ 
until 1997. In the following ‘cover-up’ period, cricket authorities resorted to quasi-legal inquiries (BCCI 
in 1997, PCB in 1998), the continued policy & practice of silence (ACB until 1998), punishment of 
whistleblowers (PCB in 1997), where there was “…the justified fear that ‘whistleblowers’ would be 
penalized rather than supported, …fear that their international careers would have come to an abrupt halt 
if they had voiced their anxieties about corruption”(Condon, 2001: para 12), non-collaboration with other 
national boards resulting in fragmenting the cases where there was “…no obvious or credible person or 
place to report matters,” (Condon, 2001: para 12) and failure to disclose to the public the pattern of 
corruption. They failed to engage external assistance until 2000, with the exception of PCB CEO Majid 
Khan, who initiated a powerful and productive government inquiry (Qayyum, 1999). Denial, minimizing 
corruption, or blaming the media were the substance of the few communication responses by authorities.  
Even in 2000, the defensive routines continued marked by non-cooperation with external authorities by 
the South African and Indian Cricket Boards (UCBSA and BCCI), and even with the ICC Anti-
Corruption Unit under Condon who found a ‘climate of silence’ able to be partly overcome by education 
and persuasion, but still only revealing ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (Condon, 2000: para 11). Legalistic 
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approaches (Sitkin and Bies, 1994) saw the problem addressed during the period 1995-1999 by use of 
internal quasi-legal inquiries seeking evidence of corruption to determine a player’s guilt, rather than the 
presence of multiple signs as a pattern indicating the presence of corruption. By looking for evidence 
without affording witnesses libel protection or clarifying the level of proof required, many potential 
allegations were silenced and their information dismissed. In internal reviews that followed the external 
inquiries, many players denied their previously admitted involvement (Madhaven, 2000: paras 41,71; 
Melick, 2001).  
The consequences of the ‘nexus of silence’ were the development of widespread corruption, the 
scandal throughout 2000-1, the resulting economic loss to cricket and loss of reputation and trust of 
authorities and many players in the institution of cricket (Condon, 2001; Haigh, 2004).  
DISCUSSION          
 
Research on the cricket match-fixing scandal indicates that a ‘nexus of silence’ about corruption 
or other unethical practice in organizations, indicative of hypocrisy by management or trustees, occurs 
under certain conditions. Firstly, certain external and internal contextual factors provide antecedent 
conditions and become exacerbating influences in the way managers react to allegations of corruption. 
They exhibit benevolent / benign authority, weak control systems, non-accountability, and tolerance of 
deviance by their elites. They seek to avoid scandal and are apathetic to the risk the real problem creates. 
Secondly, early signs of a problem may be ignored because of collective sense-making and various types 
of ambivalence. Thirdly, a critical choice to take the path of hypocrisy rather than integrity initiates the 
‘nexus of silence’ and reinforces it through organizational defensive routines which prevent participative 
and collaborative problem-solving.     
Theoretical Contributions 
This case makes three theoretical contributions – first, it provides a new substantive theory of a 
‘nexus of silence’ linked to organizational hypocrisy in certain organizations and institutions over 
corruption or other unethical behaviour; second, it suggests that organizational silence over ethical issues 
will affect not just employees but managers and other ‘captive’ stakeholders; third, it suggests the 
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incorporation of context factors identified as additional ‘organizational and environmental characteristics’ 
in Morrison & Milliken’s model of organizational silence (2004) about ethical issues. 
Implications for management 
This case is indicative of the damaging outcome for an organization or institution when 
management allows unethical behaviour contrary to its publicly expected espoused values. Organizational 
hypocrisy involved the failure of moral leadership by cricket authorities in not adhering to the 
organization’s corporate purpose (Springett, 2004), resulting in scandal, loss of reputation and public 
trust, restoration of which was difficult (Dowling, 2001). Organizational integrity, the constant practice 
by an organization of its espoused values, is necessary for stakeholder trust (Longstaff, 1994) “which 
must not be compromised for financial gain or short term expediency” (Longstaff, 1996: 7). Ethical 
practice “…implies one will act with integrity” (Longstaff, 1992: 9). Governance failure to foster ‘moral 
responsibility’ (Bird & Waters, 1989) in leaders in addressing corruption or other unethical behaviour in 
organizations can result in scandal, loss of reputation and public trust, restoration of which will be 
difficult (Dowling, 2001). A ‘nexus of silence’ is an indicator of the existence of such a risk. Risk 
management practice in organizations, including examining the identified context factors, causes and 
moderator conditions found here, would help develop risk strategies to solve the problems.  
Limitations of the study and future research directions 
The research findings have the limitations of an empirically based substantive grounded theory. 
Findings of this researcher in regard to the sex-abuse scandal case in 2002 in the Catholic Archdiocese of 
Boston (Gross, 2005), and the presence of pervasive silence noted by other researchers (Beamish, 2000; 
Hart and Hazelgrove, 2001; Morrison and Milliken, 2000, 2004; Cabban and Salter, 2005), suggests that 
the theory of ‘nexus of silence’ may have greater applicability in management research. Further directions 
for research might involve testing this theory in other scandal cases involving cover up of unethical 
behaviour, its absence where organizational integrity is chosen to address unethical behaviour, and study 
of the national cross-cultural aspects of the theory. Investigation into the inefficiency of a ‘nexus of 
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silence’, that is, the cost of consequences of organizational hypocrisy versus organizational integrity, both 
during the ‘nexus of silence’ pre-scandal and post-scandal, might also be beneficial.    
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